What is "The American Political Compass," and why was it written?
Introduction
With the rapid increase in polarization and controversy that the American political scene has experienced in recent years—an issue so rampant that this divide has come to define how the global community characterizes American politics—people have become increasingly hesitant to openly discuss it with others, especially with the "impressionable" youth. However, this reluctance to include young Americans in conversations centered around politics—such as the classic "no politics at the dinner table" mindset that pervades many American households—is actually a great disservice, not only to America's youth, but to the future of American politics as a whole. Greater civic engagement is something the country urgently needs.
In the 2020 American presidential election, 80.7% of citizens who were seventy-five years old were registered to vote, and 77.1% of them actually voted. Meanwhile, only 62.4% and 47.5% of citizens who were twenty-six and eighteen years old, respectively, were registered to vote, and only 54.3% and 41.8% of them actually voted (Fabina & Scherer, 2022). Additionally, 52% of eighteen- and nineteen-year-olds were registered to vote in the 2020 election, compared to 77% of people who were forty-five and older. If eighteen- and nineteen-year-olds had registered at the same rate as the forty-five-and-older demographic, two million more of them would have been registered to vote (Fabina & Scherer, 2022). This is not an insignificant number. The margins of victory in Pennsylvania, Arizona, and Michigan were 82,000, 10,000, and 154,000, respectively, yet 620,000, 360,000, and 520,000 people turned eighteen in those states during that election cycle (Brill, 2023). Had all of those young people been registered and actually voted, they could have had substantial influence over the 2020 presidential election results (Brill, 2023).
Furthermore, beyond young Americans being less politically active than middle-aged and older citizens, they are also less knowledgeable about civics in general. Only ten percent of Americans between the ages of eighteen and twenty-four met a standard of "informed engagement" during the 2012 presidential election cycle (Harvard Institute of Politics, 2013). This gap in knowledge is further exacerbated by socioeconomic factors: only 7% of students whose parents did not graduate high school and who are eligible for free or reduced lunch reach the "proficient" level on the National Assessment of Educational Progress in civics. High-income, White students are four to six times more likely to exceed the "proficient" level than Black or Hispanic students (Harvard Institute of Politics, 2013).
Overall, young Americans register to vote, actually vote, and demonstrate civic and political knowledge at concerningly lower rates than older Americans. There is clearly a noteworthy civic illiteracy crisis permeating American society today. First and foremost, this phenomenon is creating a political sphere that is increasingly inaccessible to young Americans and unrepresentative of their needs. Their lack of involvement leads to the election of representatives who are unfamiliar with the culture and concerns of younger generations—and those representatives feel little pressure to account for younger people's perspectives, since it is older generations who will vote for them and sustain their political careers. Second, and equally important, this phenomenon makes the future of American politics unstable. The young Americans who are currently far removed from civic life will eventually become the country's most influential generation within the next few decades. If these trends of civic illiteracy continue, only the views and interests of upper-class White people—and the politicians they support—will be meaningfully represented in state and federal government, given the persistent class and racial disparities in civic knowledge. Politicians will also find it easier to exploit loopholes and circumvent the law, as a less civically informed public will have greater difficulty recognizing abuses of power and holding officials accountable.
Purpose
For young Americans to be duly acknowledged in today's politics—and for the stability of the American political landscape to be preserved in the future—there must be more opportunities for and greater accessibility of civic education. However, American culture is currently treating civic education almost as a taboo. In one survey by the Commission on Youth Voting and Civic Knowledge, 24.8% of teachers expressed the belief that they would experience pushback from parents and community members if they discussed politics in their lessons—even hypothetically, in a government or civics class during a presidential election year (Harvard Institute of Politics, 2013). This perspective—that political discourse is too provocative and contentious for students—is endemic among older generations in America, and it is directly contributing to a concerning, self-reinforcing cycle of generational civic decline. Because adults are opposed to students being taught about government and politics, students lack the knowledge needed to seek out resources to educate themselves on relevant civic topics. They are subsequently left without the tools to advocate for and implement changes in their communities that reflect their beliefs.
“The American Political Compass” primer was written as a modest contribution to the broader effort that many young American political advocates across the country are undertaking to make civic education and participation more accessible. It consists of four brief, non-partisan articles introducing four ideologies widespread in contemporary American politics: federalism, interventionism, nationalism, and populism. Each article contains an introduction section presenting non-theoretical examples of the ideology that readers may already be familiar with; a definition section explaining the ideology in greater depth than a typical dictionary entry; and a section outlining how the ideology manifests itself specifically in American politics—since these ideologies operate differently in America than they do in other nations.
American Federalism: A Breakdown
What is federalism, and how does it play out in American politics?
Introduction
When the British Colonies seceded from the rule of Great Britain to become their own independent nation, the Framers, in drafting the newly formed country's constitutional arrangement, chose to design America's government under the principles of federalism. This was a deliberate compromise: it formally established a harmonized, interconnected union while preserving the individual cultures and political standings of the states that comprised it (Lane, 2021). However, the Framers' vision of a federalist America has been slowly fading over the past century, as the federal government has become increasingly centralized (Lane, 2021). Specifically, the recent American political scene has seen politicians writing, pushing for, and passing legislation that consolidates laws and regulations across various areas of public life—such as healthcare, education, and entitlements (Lane, 2021). Because these areas are highly contested among the American public, many are questioning the distance this policy shift is creating between politicians and the specific needs and cultural values of their constituents. The COVID-19 pandemic further brought federalism to the forefront of many Americans' minds. States were forced to adopt widely varying policies to reduce the spread of infection and the number of deaths, based on differing social conditions, environmental factors, and concentrations of high-risk individuals—with varying degrees of success (Lane, 2021).
Defining Federalism
Federalism is a type of governmental organization that unites multiple polities under one overarching political system while ensuring that each polity retains its own autonomy and integrity (Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2026). More specifically, it is a form of government where power is divided and distributed between a central—also referred to as the federal or national—government and the smaller units that comprise the whole nation, such as states and provinces. Federal systems achieve this sharing of power by requiring widespread policies to be drafted and implemented through some form of negotiation, allowing all polities to contribute their unique perspectives to the making and execution of legislation, rather than having the central government make all decisions without considering the needs of individual polities (Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2026). The core principle of federalism is establishing a system that facilitates bargaining and coordinated negotiation among several dispersed power centers, as a way to safeguard individual and local liberties and rights.
Every federalist relationship is established and confirmed through a covenant of union—typically a written constitution that can only be altered through special, lengthy procedures—which clearly outlines and delineates the powers shared between the central and state governments (Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2026). The constitution distributes power to the federal government, state governments, and all the citizens that constitute them, while also providing states with the ability to maintain their own state-specific constitutions. Additionally, every federalist system emphasizes and carries out, to the greatest extent possible, the process of noncentralization: the diffusion of power to a substantial number of self-sustaining centers—primarily to each polity that comprises the nation—in order to uphold the will of the agreed-upon constitution (Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2026). Under noncentralization, both the states and the federal government hold legitimate, exercisable authority over their constituents, and neither level of government can be stripped of its powers without mutual agreement.
Furthermore, in a federal government, the power provided to polities is further distributed according to geographic and territorial divisions—referred to as territorial democracy in America, or the areal division of power more generally (Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2026). A state is divided into territorial units, such as districts, provinces, or regions, with each unit receiving equal or fair representation in the central government to ensure neutrality and prevent favoritism (Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2026). As the demographics of a nation shift, newly diverse groups of individuals can gain representation by garnering support in the units they reside in. Additionally, with the areal division of power, different cultural, linguistic, or ethnic groups are given their own territorial areas with self-governing powers, allowing them to protect their identities, interests, and needs while remaining part of a single unified nation—such as Canada granting Quebec provincial authority as a means of protecting the cultural identity of, and providing governmental representation to, the large concentration of Francophones living in that region (Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2026).
Understanding American Federalism
In the political and governmental structure of America, federalism exists to help politicians and policymakers determine whether a prevalent policy problem should be addressed at the national or local level—or some combination of both (Sutton, n.d.). This debate has been a continuously recurring topic in American politics ever since the country's independence from Great Britain in 1776, regardless of whether the policy in question concerns public safety, taxation, education, civil rights, or criminal law. People have long advocated either for greater dispersal of power to the states or for further concentration of power in the federal government. This dispute is further fueled by two realities: federalism is not strictly or clearly defined in the Constitution—allowing for considerable interpretive flexibility and inconsistent application—and America operates on a dual sovereignty system, in which both the federal and state governments exercise overlapping control over the same territories, further blurring the question of whether certain policies should be enacted nationally or just statewide (Sutton, n.d.).
When the Framers drafted the Constitution, they intentionally designed it as a compromise between the national and state governments on the issue of states' rights and sovereignty, and as a correction to the failures of the Articles of Confederation. The Articles had made the national government too weak; under the Constitution, the national government gained just enough power to function and unify the country—especially in times of war and crisis—while leaving the majority of remaining powers to the states (Sutton, n.d.). In former Justice Anthony Kennedy's words, the Framers "split the atom of sovereignty," dividing political powers between two levels of government rather than concentrating them at one (Sutton, n.d.). This careful balance is reflected in the design of the three branches of government outlined in the Constitution's first three articles: the first article grants Congress a defined but limited set of powers—such as running the postal service and overseeing national defense—while reserving powers not listed for the citizens; the second article allows the President to lead the military and enforce federal law while leaving states the authority to enforce their own state-specific laws; and the third article grants the Supreme Court and lower federal courts the authority to interpret federal law and the Constitution, while allowing states to handle civil and criminal cases that do not directly involve federal law—which is why the majority of court cases are resolved at the state level (Sutton, n.d.).
Other constitutional features that directly protect the power of the states include the Electoral College—which requires Presidents to be elected through a majority of state electoral votes rather than a majority of the popular vote—the Senate—which provides each state an equal voice in one chamber of the national legislature by granting every state exactly two Senators—and the constitutional amendment process itself—which requires an amendment to be ratified by three-quarters of the states before it takes effect nationally (Sutton, n.d.). These features do place limits on the direct political power of individual citizens, as the majority rule of states is prioritized over the majority rule of citizens. For example, a presidential candidate can win the popular vote and still lose the election if the other candidate carries a majority of the electoral vote. Nevertheless, these features ensure that the political influence of the states is preserved regardless of the circumstances America finds itself in.
The balance of power between the state and federal governments also evolves through constitutional amendments, with each amendment shifting authority either toward the states or toward the national government. The Twenty-First Amendment, for instance, asserts that states have full control over regulating alcoholic beverages, while the Nineteenth Amendment guarantees women the right to vote regardless of which state they reside in (Sutton, n.d.). Occasionally, however, the national government takes actions that override states' rights when it deems doing so necessary. During the Civil Rights Era, for example, states' handling of slavery and racial discrimination caused such division within the country that the national government passed the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments after the Civil War—ending slavery, granting citizenship to all persons born in America and requiring states to provide equal protection to all citizens, and extending voting rights to people of color, respectively (Sutton, n.d.).
Even so, states frequently protect citizens' rights ahead of the federal government. State constitutions often provide more extensive protections of individual rights than the federal constitution does, and state courts can interpret constitutional rights differently, adapt their rulings to local culture and history, and fill in legal gaps left by federal courts—providing citizens an additional layer of legal protection (Sutton, n.d.). States further advance the rights of citizens by serving as laboratories for new laws and policies (Sutton, n.d.). Successful experiments have the potential to be adopted by other states or even become national law, all without risking the widespread consequences that unsuccessful ideas might cause if implemented at the national level from the outset. This dynamic ultimately fosters innovation in the pursuit of liberty and democracy throughout America.
American Interventionism: A Breakdown
What is interventionism, and how does it play out in American politics?
Introduction
From 1898 to 1994, the American government successfully intervened in the political and social operations of various Latin American countries to overthrow or change their governments forty-one times (Coatsworth, 2005). This figure does not include the number of attempts in which America sought—but failed—to overturn a Latin American government, nor the multiple incidents in which the American government prevented a coup d'état or otherwise took action to stop an incumbent administration from being deposed (Coatsworth, 2005). Of the forty-one successful cases, seventeen were direct interventions—in which America deployed its military or intelligence forces to carry out an operation—while twenty-four were indirect interventions—in which America supported local forces financially, economically, and diplomatically to carry out its objectives (Coatsworth, 2005). Successful or not, America was a constant, active force in Latin American countries' daily operations and geopolitical relations throughout the entire twentieth century, with American officials consistently justifying their actions as matters of national security. However, America did not face a significant military threat from any Latin American nation during this period. The Pentagon itself did not believe that the Soviet installation of missiles in Cuba in 1962 substantially altered the balance of nuclear power between the United States and the Soviet Union—a fact that led many to question and scrutinize America's true motives behind any of its forty-one interventions (Coatsworth, 2005).
Defining Interventionism
Interventionism is the practice or policy of one country interfering in the attitudes, policies, or behaviors of another, encompassing the characteristics, causes, and purposes behind such interference (Sibii, 2014). It exists in numerous forms: political—intervening in another country's affairs to influence its administration or policies; humanitarian—intervening to protect the rights and freedoms of a certain group of people; military—intervening to gain power through threat or explicit force; or economic—intervening to influence another country's economy or behavior through indirect financial tools (Sibii, 2014).
For an act of government to be considered interventionism, it must be coercive in nature: it must be both threatening and unwelcome to the target country (Sibii, 2014). Defensive warfare conducted within a country's own legal borders, or diplomatic talks aimed at persuading another nation to adopt a desired policy, would not qualify as interventionism. At the core of all types of interventionism is aggression—either a country uses the intangible threat of violence to pressure another into compliance, or it uses outright, tangible force to enact the change it seeks. Interventionist acts can be broadly divided into two categories: militaristic and non-militaristic (Sibii, 2014). Militaristic interventions include the threat of invasion, actual invasion, or any action taken to depose a government or force policy changes (Sibii, 2014). Non-militaristic interventions include targeted assassinations of officials, economic blockades, or nationally enforced boycotts (Sibii, 2014).
The merits, morality, and legality of interventionism have been heavily questioned and debated by politicians, philosophers, and citizens—both those directly and indirectly affected by it—for centuries. Its legality is ambiguous, as the universal laws governing interventionism are vague and leave considerable room for interpretation and loopholes (Sibii, 2014). Its morality is equally unclear, if not more so. On this question, two main perspectives exist: opponents, who argue that interventionism is nothing other than unjustified violence and is therefore inherently unethical regardless of intent; and supporters, who argue that interventionism can be a moral duty to protect the weak from their oppressors—though even supporters disagree among themselves about when and how a country should engage in it (Sibii, 2014).
Understanding American Interventionism
Even though the perils of the Cold War receded in Europe in the early 1990s, the American government, under former President George H.W. Bush, continued to prepare for and engage in numerous conflicts in developing countries as though Cold-War-era threats were still present (Evera, 1991). This was evidenced by one-third of America's defense budget being allocated toward military forces designated for intervention in third-world countries—including aircraft carriers and rapid-deployment army units—with only marginal budget cuts planned for the future (Evera, 1991). Around this same time, America was involved in various proxy wars across the Third World, such as in Cambodia, Afghanistan, and El Salvador, providing military support and funding to right-wing governments and rebel coalitions fighting against Soviet-backed or leftist governments and insurgent groups (Evera, 1991). America's stated justification for these interventions was the prevention of communism's global spread. That justification, however, was invalidated by the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union—yet America continued to remain involved in these proxy wars, even stalling progress toward resolution during peace talks by adopting contentious positions and making extreme demands (Evera, 1991).
Proponents of America's Cold-War-style interventions in developing countries argue that such actions are necessary for national security, preventing communism from regaining influence over global politics, and that they serve a moral obligation by freeing residents of intervened countries from the oppressive, authoritarian rule the Soviet Union championed—instilling democracy, liberty, and human rights in their place (Evera, 1991). Opponents, however, contend that it was incorrect to assume the Soviet Union's influence on the Third World would be lasting or impactful enough to spark another wave of Soviet-style communist nations (Evera, 1991). The Soviet Union did not even seek an empire in the Third World, with Soviet expansionism largely halting by the late Cold War—as evidenced by former President Gorbachev allowing the Eastern Bloc to democratize in 1989 (Evera, 1991). Moreover, the Soviet Union could not have built a Third World empire with or without American intervention, since nationalism in Third World countries made them unreliable Soviet proxies. This was evident in Cambodia and Vietnam, both led by communist forces yet still going to war with each other due to Cambodia's nationalism and its deep historical hostility toward Vietnam (Evera, 1991). Furthermore, American control over Third World countries would not have meaningfully tipped the global balance of power against communist or socialist forces, as these countries held low industrial, social, and economic influence. In the age of nuclear weapons, decisive power depends not on territory but on the strength of a nation's nuclear arsenal (Evera, 1991).
Because many find unconvincing the American government's claim that its interventions stem purely from national security concerns and opposition to communism and socialism, an alternative school of thought has emerged: that America's interventionist actions are economically motivated. This school of thought is divided into two variants, attributing America's behavior to corruption and capitalism, respectively. The theory centered on corruption contends that America intervenes in developing nations to protect the interests of large, influential American corporations (Evera, 1991). Geopolitical analysts, however, assert that even if a business-related incentive exists, corporate interests alone are not sufficient justification for America to invest the considerable time and resources that intervention requires—unless other political or strategic concerns are also at play (Evera, 1991). The theory centered on capitalism argues that America intervenes not to protect individual corporations, but to defend the broader private enterprise system itself, thereby benefiting all American corporations with stakes in the affected region (Evera, 1991). American politicians and officials have consistently emphasized the need for free enterprise across the world, lending surface-level credibility to this view (Evera, 1991). However, in most of the developing countries where America intervened, capitalism was not actually under threat—much in the same way that America claimed its intervention efforts were aimed at restoring democracy, even as it frequently overthrew elected officials in democratic regimes (Evera, 1991).
Geopolitical analysts instead propose that America's interventionist behavior is fundamentally driven by the perceived cost of intervention. Intervention becomes more likely when it requires little time, money, resources, or political capital, and when failure would not seriously damage American political interests (Evera, 1991). When those conditions are met, the decision to intervene is then shaped by both domestic and global strategic considerations. On the domestic side, many American presidents have intervened abroad to bolster their reputations or deflect political attacks from fellow politicians or constituents—as when former President Lyndon B. Johnson sent troops to the Dominican Republic in 1965 under pressure from Congressional Republicans (Evera, 1991). On the global side, American politicians have intervened to preempt hypothetical future threats, as when policymakers supported over nine Latin American governments during the 1960s out of fear of communism's rapid spread—even as various American intelligence agencies repeatedly concluded that no leftist coalition in Latin America posed a serious threat and that a leftist revolution was unlikely to occur (Evera, 1991).
American Nationalism: A Breakdown
What is nationalism, and how does it play out in American politics?
Introduction
American flags of varying sizes are a common sight on private properties across the country—from the beds of pickup trucks to the front lawns of houses. Every American student from the age of five to eighteen recites the Pledge of Allegiance as a daily habit, and the national anthem is performed at virtually every sporting event, no matter how minor. As a result, America is recognized across the globe as a uniquely nationalistic society. Many Americans, however, do not see themselves as nationalistic, as the term carries numerous negative connotations—being associated with suppressive, authoritarian, and racist regimes such as Francisco Franco's Spanish State and Kim Il-sung's North Korea (Pei, 2003). Yet nationalism is undeniably present in America. Researchers at the University of Chicago found that 49% of surveyed Americans agreed with the statement, "The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like Americans" (Pei, 2003). Researchers at the Pew Research Center found that 79% of surveyed Americans agreed that "it's good that American ideas and customs are spreading around the world" (Pei, 2003). Many American politicians also rely on charged issues such as flag burning and national security to discredit opponents and bolster their own platforms (Pei, 2003). American nationalism simply does not take the same form as the nationalism that permeated Benito Mussolini's Italy.
Defining Nationalism
Throughout the entire history of human civilization, people have been attached to their native territory, the traditions and culture of their communities, and the leaders of those communities. However, nationalism as a recognized movement and sentiment—one that shaped how people behaved and thought about public and private life—did not begin to meaningfully impact global interactions and geopolitics until the end of the eighteenth century (Kohn, 2026). The American and French Revolutions are widely regarded as the first true human declarations of nationalism (Kohn, 2026). Nationalism is an ideology and movement built on the idea that a citizen's dedication and loyalty should belong primarily to their nation above all other allegiances, such as to family, religion, or social class (Kohn, 2026). It holds that one should act in ways that protect, uphold, and glorify their nation, even at personal or social cost. This idea spread across Europe in the nineteenth century and rose—with greater struggle, given the presence of strong colonial European powers—across Asia and Africa in the twentieth century (Kohn, 2026). Nationalism also promotes the ideal of the nation-state, in which every nationality has its own state and every state encompasses, as far as is practicable, all members of a particular nationality (Kohn, 2026). From this core idea follows the belief that national borders should be drawn along purely cultural, linguistic, or ethnic lines.
For much of early history, the concept of the nation-state was rarely discussed or idealized. Universal world-states—nations striving to unite all citizens across the world—were the dominant model, exemplified by the rise of empires such as the Roman and Holy Roman Empires (Kohn, 2026). Rather than countries and loyalties being determined by nationality, they were dictated by religion—as with Christian and Muslim nations during the Middle Ages—by shared cultural movements—as with Europeans united in their pursuit of Greek and Roman ideals during the Renaissance—and by social class—with France, for instance, regarded as the rightful home of elite, educated European culture (Kohn, 2026). The shift began in the late 1700s, when people started to consider the idea that civilizations are fundamentally shaped by local nationalities (Kohn, 2026). This set off a domino effect: schools shifted their educational priorities away from foreign and classical languages toward local ones, and writers and scholars elevated those local languages from everyday speech to literary and cultural vehicles (Kohn, 2026). Compounding this was a growth in secularization, trade, capitalism, and the number of strong centralized monarchies—all of which required more consolidated territories, both in size and culture, while diminishing the influence of religious authority (Kohn, 2026). A rising middle class also sought political and economic influence, leading people in the eighteenth century to conclude that sovereignty over a state belongs only to the people who comprise it (Kohn, 2026).
Understanding American Nationalism
American nationalism differentiates itself from "Old World" nationalism—the nationalist movements that arose in various European nations, where leaders mobilized their populations by emphasizing ethnic, religious, or cultural superiority—primarily in that American nationalism stresses the superiority of American political principles: democracy and freedom (Pei, 2003). Another hallmark of American nationalism is that American nationalists do not recognize themselves as nationalists. Instead, they believe in the universality of American political ideals, a conviction rooted in their belief in those ideals' supreme value—which leads them to underestimate and misunderstand the nationalist movements seen in other nations (Pei, 2003). Because America is a diverse, multiethnic state, Americans tend to think of themselves as patriotic rather than nationalistic, especially given that "Old World" nationalism gave rise to many oppressive, authoritarian regimes. Political scientists have attempted to distinguish patriotism from nationalism—defining patriotism as love and loyalty toward one's country, and nationalism as the belief that one's country and people are superior to all others (Pei, 2003). In practice, however, the two manifest in nearly identical ways psychologically, behaviorally, and politically, particularly when politicians are developing and enacting policy (Pei, 2003).
What further blurs the line between patriotism and nationalism in America is Americans' belief in the superiority of their governmental system over those of nations across both the developing and developed world. According to researchers at the University of Chicago, 97% of surveyed Americans agreed with the statement, "I would rather be a citizen of America than of any other country in the world" (Pei, 2003). According to the Pew Research Center, 70% agreed that they "like American ideas of democracy." Americans' own view of their country's democracy, freedom, and culture is considerably more positive and idealistic than how citizens of other countries perceive them—reinforcing the idea that American nationalism is rooted in a belief in the supremacy of American values (Pei, 2003). The same Pew Research Center study found that fewer than 40% of people surveyed in Western European countries supported the spread of American ideas and customs, and only 50% agreed with America's ideas about democracy (Pei, 2003). Americans' markedly higher rate of national pride compared to other nations—particularly European ones—lies at the foundation of American nationalism and ultimately distinguishes it from its "Old World" counterparts.
As noted above, Americans do not recognize their own nationalism, in part because it focuses on maintaining and spreading America's way of governing and its political ideals of democracy and freedom—rather than on race, ethnicity, or culture. This distinction was captured by George W. Bush in a Fourth of July speech: "There is no American race; there's only an American creed" (Pei, 2003). Americans' lack of awareness of their own nationalist tendencies also stems from the fact that American nationalism is citizen-driven rather than state-driven—which was the defining characteristic of "Old World" nationalism. In the early nineteenth century, the French philosopher Alexis de Tocqueville labeled this phenomenon civic volunteerism: the willingness of everyday citizens to voluntarily contribute to the public good through individual endeavors or civic associations (Pei, 2003). This civic volunteerism fostered a culture in which Americans relied on themselves rather than on the government to solve local, national, and international problems—leading to significant citizen-driven advancements in science, technology, military strength, and economic wealth (Pei, 2003). These achievements, in turn, bolstered national pride and encouraged Americans to continue the cycle of civic volunteerism (Pei, 2003). Rather than enforcing nationalism through military displays, parades, or media laws—as authoritarian nationalist nations commonly did—American nationalism is purely cultural, civic, and voluntary. The absence of government involvement in upholding American nationalism allowed it to embed itself deeply into American culture, as there was no authoritarian imposition to provoke resistance. Nationalism thus became fully ingrained in the everyday lives of American citizens—which is precisely why so many fail to notice it.
Beyond civic volunteerism, what makes American nationalism unique is its triumphal character. In many other countries—such as India and Egypt—nationalism stems from grievances and losses: invasions, historic humiliation, and colonialism (Pei, 2003). People are united by shared grief and trauma. American nationalism, by contrast, is built on success and achievement, in both peace and war (Pei, 2003). Americans generate and share pride by celebrating and promoting their country's victories. Because American nationalism is not oriented toward past glories or humiliations, its driving force is a vision of the future—one in which America remains influential and prosperous, continuously improving itself while spreading its values abroad (Pei, 2003). This gives American nationalism a distinctly missionary spirit. However, this missionary edge, combined with a lack of self-awareness, leads America to misunderstand and underestimate the depth of nationalism in other countries (Pei, 2003). The consequences have been significant: military interventions have backfired, as in the Vietnam War, and resentment has built abroad, particularly in the Middle East and Latin America (Pei, 2003).
American Populism: A Breakdown
What is populism, and how does it play out in American politics?
Introduction
Although populism has existed as a force in global politics for centuries—with the United States having its own Populist Movement that gave rise to the People's Party, whose demands led to laws enacting a progressive tax system as well as ballot initiatives and referendums in many American states—the term has recently surged in usage, becoming a buzzword for news outlets, political commentators, activists, and social media users alike (Postel, 2016). This phenomenon can largely be attributed to the rise of so-called populist politicians over the past couple of decades, such as Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump (Postel, 2016). A Los Angeles Times reporter wrote about "the populist sentiment fueling both the Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump campaigns," and a New Yorker pundit analyzed both campaigns under the heading "The Populists" (Postel, 2016). That Bernie Sanders—one of the longest-serving progressive members of Congress—and Donald Trump—a real estate tycoon and reality television host turned conservative President—are both confidently described as "populists" by journalists and political analysts, despite having remarkably dissimilar policies and temperaments, is a strong indicator of just how flexible the term has become.
Defining Populism
In its most basic form, populism refers to a political movement or program that aims to champion the rights and freedoms of the average citizen by combating the perceived elite class and its entrenched establishments (Munro, 2026). It draws from both ends of the political spectrum, opposing large business and financial interests while also criticizing conventional political representation—favoring direct democracy instead—and opposing any effort that mediates the relationship between the federal government and its everyday citizens (Munro, 2026). Rather than aligning with the ideals or policies of any particular part of the political spectrum, populism primarily seeks to maximize the political power of ordinary people and promote their interests through reform, rather than through the revolution that other political movements—such as communism, which populists oppose—advocate (Munro, 2026).
In practice, populism in global politics has frequently served as a vehicle for leaders to establish authoritarianism. Historically, this has involved a charismatic leader who cultivated a cult of personality and rose to power by portraying themselves as a trustworthy authority capable of embodying and enforcing the will of the average citizen (Munro, 2026). Once in power, such leaders rendered political parties and elections largely meaningless, reducing them to tools for consolidating authority and suppressing political opponents and dissidents. Populist societies of this kind have typically been characterized by extreme nationalism, fear-mongering, and the scapegoating of minorities and marginalized groups, as leaders leveraged their popularity to continue accumulating power while distracting citizens from their failures, corruption, or the true scale of the economic and social problems they were experiencing (Munro, 2026).
With the twentieth and twenty-first centuries witnessing the rise and fall of populist authoritarian leaders and regimes across Latin America and Europe—in countries such as Argentina and Turkey—the term "populist" has taken on an increasingly negative connotation (Munro, 2026). It is now commonly used to criticize political leaders who pander to their constituents' fears and hopes while contradicting their own stated messages, revealing a desire for political power rather than genuine public service (Munro, 2026). A populist agenda can therefore be either a sincere platform to enact legislation that promotes the collective good, or a political strategy to cultivate a loyal base that secures a politician's career and provides cover for legislation that benefits only themselves and their social circles.
Understanding American Populism
Classical populism—populism as defined and analyzed by ancient Greek philosophers such as Aristotle and Plato—is described as a straightforward and plausible pathway to the decay of a democratic system (Olsen, 2010). In classical populism, a demagogue—a charismatic leader who claims to speak for the common people—manipulates their deepest fears and desires with extreme rhetoric, pitting them against government officials and those in power and encouraging them to assemble into large crowds that override established law, all under the promise of social and economic mobility (Olsen, 2010). With this overwhelming seizure of government, the majority uses its newly gained power to redistribute wealth to itself while punishing and ousting its enemies, typically those in the government it overthrew (Olsen, 2010).
Classical populism follows a recognizable arc. It begins with many ordinary people feeling oppressed and powerless (Olsen, 2010). A leader then exploits that sense of victimhood to construct a common enemy—typically those with more wealth or power—who are blamed for the people's suffering and diminished quality of life (Olsen, 2010). After gaining the full trust of this audience, the leader urges them to take action, seek vengeance against their so-called oppressors, and seize control using the force of the majority (Olsen, 2010). Once their enemies have been deposed, the leader consolidates all newly gained power and proceeds to ignore the rights and livelihoods of those enemies while benefiting from their new position (Olsen, 2010). Throughout this process, ordinary citizens are transformed from rational, discerning individuals into an emotionally charged and easily manipulated crowd. The leader is elevated above accountability, and what began as a democracy ends as a dictatorship. This pattern has appeared across a wide variety of governmental systems, from ancient Greek democracies to communist, socialist, and fascist societies (Olsen, 2010). The designated "enemy" varies—foreign powers, racial or religious groups, or the wealthy and powerful—but the outcome is consistent: a government ruled by the people is replaced by one ruled by a single person (Olsen, 2010).
James Madison, widely regarded as the "Father of the Constitution," was deeply concerned about America falling into this cycle when designing the constitutional framework. He believed that public emotion and the passions of the masses could overwhelm the reason and deliberation necessary for a democracy to sustain itself, and that charismatic leaders could manipulate disparate factions into coalitions built around their own ambitions (Olsen, 2010). He therefore designed the Constitution to organize the American government in ways that prevent demagogues from easily seizing control, limit what majorities can unilaterally accomplish, and curb the sudden rise of populist movements (Olsen, 2010). Despite the fact that inequality and limited economic mobility are more pronounced in America than in much of Europe, no major attempt to manifest classical populism has succeeded in the United States (Olsen, 2010). America has never produced a significant socialist or communist party, and radical populist movements have rarely succeeded electorally. A form of populism does exist in American politics, but it differs from the classical model. American populism prioritizes balancing governmental power, ensuring institutional fairness, and forming coalitions—rather than tearing institutions down—as a check on entrenched elites and corrupt officials (Olsen, 2010). In American culture, citizens tend to view themselves as self-governing individuals with a degree of ownership over their government, leading them to distrust concentrated power and to address injustices through reform rather than abolition (Olsen, 2010).
American populism differs from classical populism in three fundamental ways. First, American citizens are not cast as powerless victims in desperate need of a strong leader to rescue them. Rather, American populism views ordinary people as hardworking and capable individuals who have simply been blocked from success by unjust systems (Olsen, 2010). Leaders of American populist movements therefore push to open opportunities for average Americans, rather than positioning themselves as saviors that citizens must depend upon (Olsen, 2010). Second, American citizens do not perceive their adversaries as inherently evil or undeserving of rights—as classical populism would have them do. In the American populist tradition, the "enemy," typically the elite, is viewed as a fellow citizen who is misguided or corrupt and in need of persuasion or reform, while still retaining their fundamental rights (Olsen, 2010). Third, the goal of American populism is not the forcible redistribution of wealth, the punishment of enemies, or the confiscation of property—the common outcomes in classical populist societies. American populists instead advocate for reforming government systems to make them fairer and for pressuring officials to be responsive to ordinary citizens rather than to elite interests, all in service of allowing average Americans to achieve success on their own terms (Olsen, 2010). American populists do not seek to become demagogues with a cult-like following. They strive to build broad and effective political coalitions that challenge the economic and political influence of elites, with the ultimate goal of enabling ordinary Americans to independently achieve social and economic mobility.
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